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STATE OF WASHINGTON
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No. 96242-1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

vs.

RICHARD G. NEIGHBARGER,

Petitioner

APPEAL FROM DIVISION II
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
#50033-7-II

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....2

I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER3

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION3

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW3

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE4

 A. *Procedural History*.....4

 B. *Facts*.....4

V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED4

 A. *THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION PREVENTING MR. NEIGHBARGER THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A DEFENSE.*4

 B. *THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMING THE ADMISSION OF COMFORMITY EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO ER 404(b), TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF LUSTFUL DISPOSITION TO A CHILD.*.....7

 C. *THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION ALLOWING AN AMENDMENT OF CHARGES DURING TRIAL WITHOUT REGARD TO PREJUDICE TO A DEFENDANT DENIES A DEFENDANT HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL.*10

 D. *THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED STATE V. HUTTON AND STATE V. COLQUITT IN HOLDING THAT CONVICTONS CAN BE BASED ON NOTHING MORE THAN GUESSWORK.*11

VI. CONCLUSION13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

<i>Holmes v. South Carolina</i> , 547 U.A. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164, L.Ed.2d 503 (2006)	5
<i>State v. Baeza</i> , 100 Wn.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983).....	11
<i>State v. Cayetano-Jaimes</i> , 190 Wn.App. 286, 298, 359 P.3d 919 (2015)	5
<i>State v. Colquitt</i> , 133 Wn.App. 789, 137 P.3d 892 (2006).....	4, 12, 13
<i>State v. Freeman</i> , 153 Wn. 2d 765, 770-71, 108 P.3d 753 (2005).....	12
<i>State v. Green</i> , 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).....	12
<i>State v. Gresham</i> , 173 Wn.2d 405, 421, 269 P.3d 207 (2012).....	7
<i>State v. Gunderson</i> , 181 Wn.2d 916, 921, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014).....	7
<i>State v. Hutton</i> , 7 Wn.App. 726, 728, 502 P.2d 1346 (1971).....	12, 13
<i>State v. Lizarraga</i> , 191 Wn.App. 530, 552, 364 P.3d 810 (2015)(.....	5
<i>State v. Pelkey</i> , 109 Wn.2d 484, 745 P.2d 854 (1987).....	4, 10, 11
<i>State v. Ray</i> , 116 Wn.2d 531, 547, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991)	7
<i>State v. Russell</i> , 171 Wn.2d 118, 249 P.3d 604 (2011).....	8
<i>State v. Slocum</i> , 183 Wn.App. 438, 448, 333 P.3d 541 (2014).....	7
<i>State v. Tvedt</i> , 153 Wn.2d 705, 711, 107 P.3d 728 (2005).....	13
<i>State v. Weisberg</i> , 65 Wn.App. 721, 724, 829 P.2d 252 (1992).....	12

Statutes

Article 1 § 22.....	10
---------------------	----

Other Authorities

Fifth Amendment	12
Fourteenth Amendment.....	4
Sixth Amendment.....	4

Rules

CrR 2.1	10
ER 403.....	7
ER 404.....	7
RAP 13	4

I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Richard Neighbarger, petitioner, respectfully requests that this Court accept review of the Court of Appeals decision in case number 50033-7-II terminating review designated in Part II of this petition.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court review the Court of Appeals decision, affirming the trial court's decision in this case. The Court of Appeals erroneously determined that propensity evidence of lustful disposition was relevant to the issues in the trial and did not prejudice Mr. Neighbarger, that the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Mr. Neighbarger of the charges, and that Mr. Neighbarger was not prevented from presenting a defense.

A copy of the decision from the Court of Appeals, Division II, terminating review which was filed on August 1, 2018 is attached as Exhibit "A".

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the decision to prevent reputation evidence as to the victim's credibility into trial violated Mr. Neighbarger's due process rights to present a defense?

2. Whether evidence of uncharged allegations of sexual contact involving adults can be used to show lustful disposition of an adult toward a minor?

3. Whether convictions can be based on evidence that is nothing more than speculative and/or based on nothing more than guesswork?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. *Procedural History*

The petitioner adopts the procedural history as set forth in his opening brief.

B. *Facts*

The petitioner adopts the statement of facts as set forth in his opening brief.

V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court accept review of this case as it conflicts with the federal and state constitutional protections of being able to present a defense and conflicts with decisions of this Court and other Court of Appeals decisions. Specifically, the case is in conflict with those constitutional principles set forth in *State v. Jones*, 168 Wn.2d 713, 230 P.3d 576 (2010); *State v. Pelkey*, 109 Wn.2d 484, 745 P.2d 854 (1987); and *State v. Colquitt*, 133 Wn.App. 789, 137 P.3d 892 (2006), as well as other cases. Thus, review is appropriate pursuant to RAP 13.4(b)(1), (2), and (3).

A. *THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION PREVENTING MR. NEIGHBARGER THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A DEFENSE.*

“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.” *Holmes v. South Carolina*, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164, L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (quoting *Crane v. Kentucky*, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)). As stated by the United States Supreme Court:

“...in plain terms the right to present a defense [is] the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution’s witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”

State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn.App. 530, 552, 364 P.3d 810 (2015)(quoting *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 409, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988)(quoting *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1019 (1967))).

As noted by Division I, per se rules, excluding an entire class of testimony, may violate a defendant’s right to present a complete defense. *State v. Cayetano-Jaimes*, 190 Wn.App. 286, 298, 359 P.3d 919 (2015) (citation omitted). Indeed, as the court noted, a defendant ‘...has the right to present relevant evidence, and “[i]f relevant, the burden is on the State to show the evidence is so prejudicial as to disrupt the fairness of the fact-finding process at trial.”’ 190 Wn. App. at 297-98 (quoting *State v. Jones*, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010)).

Here, the defense and the state called Sarah Neighbarger to the stand to testify to various facts relevant to the case. However, the defense was precluded from questioning her regarding J.N.’s reputation for veracity. Indeed, the state’s argument, which the court accepted, was that the evidentiary rules in essence

categorically prohibited the proffered testimony. It impeded the defense ability to present a defense and denied his due process rights, while the state was allowed to bolster the witness's credibility and argue it to the jury during closing argument.

In upholding the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:

... Neighbarger's proffered reputation testimony concerned only JN's reputation with his mother, Sarah, 158 Wn.2d at 805. Defense counsel stated, "I want to ask her ... about [JN's] reputation and truthfulness, because she has it in the negative." 6 VRP at 514. Sarah's opinion of JN's truthfulness, as testimony of a single family member, does not meet the general community nor the neutrality requirements to provide a foundation for ER 608 evidence.

Court's Opinion at 9.

As stated in *State v. Jones, supra*, a defendant's constitutional right to be heard in his defense includes the right to present relevant evidence, evidence that can "...be withheld only if the State's interest outweighs the defendant's need" in the context of the integrity of the truth finding process and the defendant's right to a fair trial. *Jones* at 14.

The Court of Appeals ignored these principles when deciding a proper foundation was not laid because the testimony originated from the victim's mother. The rules were not designed to be so limited. Moreover, the decisions restricting the admissibility of this testimony did not address situations where the parent is attempting to give testimony of one's reputation for dishonesty in the context of allegations of domestic abuse of one family member against another. That, of course, should go to the weight, as opposed to its admissibility, especially when the prosecution and defense of the case involves the credibility of the accusers and the accused.

B. *THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMING THE ADMISSION OF CONFORMITY EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO ER 404(b), TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF LUSTFUL DISPOSITION TO A CHILD.*

Generally, evidence of a defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show that he has a propensity to commit crimes. ER 404 (b); *State v. Gunderson*, 181 Wn.2d 916, 921, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014). But such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of the defendant's lustful disposition towards the victim or to prove a common scheme or plan. *State v. Gresham*, 173 Wn.2d 405, 421, 269 P.3d 207 (2012); *State v. Ray*, 116 Wn.2d 531, 547, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991).

When the State offers evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct, before admitting the evidence, the trial court must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the prior misconduct occurred; (2) identify the purpose for introducing the evidence; (3) determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged; and (4) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. *Gunderson*, 181 Wn.2d at 923; ER 403; ER 404(b). The trial court must conduct this analysis on the record, *State v. Slocum*, 183 Wn.App. 438, 448, 333 P.3d 541 (2014), something it did not do here.

Perhaps more importantly, however, the court allowed the evidence for prohibited purposes. *Gunderson, supra*.

Both J.N. and Z.N. testified about text messages and an alleged incident occurring between Mr. Neighborger allegedly performed oral sex on Z.N. during the summer of 2015. At the time of the alleged incident Z.N. was 19 years old. He had previously testified that the last time he had been sexually assaulted was

when he was no older than 14 years of age. The state requested that the evidence be admitted to show lustful disposition. The court admitted the evidence to show “the norm within the family” and lustful disposition. RP 17: 12-17. The Court of Appeals held:

Furthermore, the State’s reliance on *Russell* provides additional support that the lustful disposition evidence was admissible. In *Russell*, our Supreme Court concluded, in part, that the trial court did not err when it admitted evidence under ER 404(b) of sexual acts between the defendant and victim that occurred both before and after the charged crimes to prove Russell’s lustful disposition toward his victim. 171 Wn.2d at 121-24. Here, like in *Russell*, the trial court properly admitted lustful disposition evidence of sexual acts between the defendant and victim that occurred after the last alleged sexual abuse.

Court’s Opinion at 12.

However, *State v. Russell*, 171 Wn.2d 118, 249 P.3d 604 (2011) involved acts of child rape. In a situation where the evidence is to show his disposition to commit child rape of the victim when the evidence is that the encounter involved consenting adults, the evidence is not relevant. It simply cannot be reasonably argued that any lustful disposition that existed towards an adult makes it more probable that the accused had the same lustful disposition towards the individual when he/she was no more than fourteen years of age. Under these circumstances the evidence was not relevant. While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the evidence was prejudicial in passing, it nevertheless found that it’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, without articulating a basis for that holding. It held:

...the record is sufficient for us to determine that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. See *State v. Hepton*, 113 Wn.App. 673, 688, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). The trial court identified that the purpose of the evidence was to show "lustful disposition and the norm within the family that allegedly had been created." 1VRP at 17. As the *Hepton* court held, on review we can weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect. 113 Wn.App at 688. The lustful disposition evidence is probative of Neighbarger's lustful inclination toward JN, which makes it more probable that he committed the charged offenses, including incest. See *Ray*, 116 Wn.2d at 547. Although evidence that Neighbarger initiated sex with his adult child is prejudicial, it is not more prejudicial than probative in the context of Neighbarger's trial for numerous acts of rape, molestation, and incest. Because the lustful disposition evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, the trial court's failure to conduct the balancing test on the record is harmless, and the lustful disposition evidence was properly admitted under ER 404(b). See *Hepton*, 113 Wn.App. at 688, 116 Wn.2d at 547.

Court's Opinion at 13.

The fallacy of the court's opinion appears to be that it will not find that the erroneous introduction of propensity evidence will be prejudicial when there are a multitude of charges. The problem is that all of these charges predated the allegation that Mr. Neighbarger had engaged in inappropriate behavior with his then adult son. To suggest that any alleged lustful disposition towards an adult means he had the same lustful disposition when the victim was a child is simply not supported by any scientific foundation or common sense. The court should accept review to address this issue.

C. *THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION ALLOWING AN AMENDMENT OF CHARGES DURING TRIAL WITHOUT REGARD TO PREJUDICE TO A DEFENDANT DENIES A DEFENDANT HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL.*

CrR 2.1(e) provides:

Amendment. The court may permit any information or bill of particulars to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.

Any amendment within the parameters of CrR 2.1(e) must not violate the restrictions contained within Article 1 § 22. During the investigatory phase of a case amendments to the original information are liberally allowed. *State v. Pelkey*, 109 Wn.2d 484, 490, 745 P.2d 854 (1987). However, as noted in *Pelkey*, the constitutionality of amending the information after trial has already begun presents a different question. As stated therein:

Mid-trial amendment of a criminal information has been allowed where the amendment merely specified a different manner of committing the crime originally charged, *State v. Gosser*, 33 Wn.App. 428, 656 P.2d 514 (1982), or charged a lower degree of the original crime charged, *State v. Brown*, 74 Wn.2d 799, 447 P.2d 82 (1968). A criminal charge may not be amended after the State has rested its case-in-chief unless the amendment is to a lesser degree of the same charge or a lesser included offense. Anything else is a violation of the defendant's article 1, section 22 right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. Such a violation necessarily prejudices this substantial constitutional right, within the meaning of CrR 2.1(e). The trial court committed reversible error in permitting this mid-trial amendment.

Id. at 490-91.

Similarly, the Court should reverse the conviction on Count XIII. This was not an amendment to a lesser included charge or changing the manner of the charge. It was allowing the state to change the factual allegation mid way through trial to the detriment of Mr. Neighbarger in violation of his right to notice of the charges against him.

Neighbarger asserts that the State's amendment violated the holding in *State v. Pelkey*, 109 Wn.2d 484, 490-91, 745 P.2d 854 (1987). But Neighbarger's reliance on *Pelkey* is misplaced. *Pelkey* holds that the State may not amend the information *after* it rests its case in chief unless it is to reduce the severity of the charges. 109 Wn.2d at 490-91. In Neighbarger's case, the amendment occurred before the State rested its case. *Pelkey* fails to support that the amendment was improper. Neighbarger has thus failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to amend the time period covered by count XIII. See CrR 2.1(d); *Schaffer*, 120, Wn.2d at 621-22.

Court's Opinion at 14.

Pelkey, however, speaks to prejudice based on an amendment during trial. It was not restricted to amendments after the state rests. Nor should it be. The issue is one of prejudice, which can occur and did occur by changing the time range after discovery, investigation and parts of the trial had already occurred. Under this scenario, Mr. Neighbarger was prejudiced, and the Court should accept review.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED STATE V. HUTTON AND STATE V. COLQUITT IN HOLDING THAT CONVICITONS CAN BE BASED ON NOTHING MORE THAN GUESSWORK.

As this Court is aware, due process requires the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Baeza*, 100 Wn.2d 487, 488, 670 P.2d 646 (1983). When challenging the sufficiency of evidence, this court must determine:

[w]hether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Weisberg, 65 Wn.App. 721, 724, 829 P.2d 252 (1992). *See also, State v. Green*, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). However, notwithstanding this proposition, the existence of a fact cannot rest upon guess, speculation, or conjecture. *State v. Hutton*, 7 Wn.App. 726, 728, 502 P.2d 1346 (1971). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is fact sensitive. *State v. Colquitt*, 133 Wn.App.789, 799, 137 P.3d 892 (2006).

Here, the jury was allowed to convict Mr. Neighbarger of Counts XI, XII and XIII based on mere speculation. The testimony of both J.N. and Z.N. differed in so many respects that any conviction could only be based on speculation. The dates were inconsistent, the description of the events were inconsistent and, notwithstanding the courts decision to allow the oral amendment of the information, the testimony was so inconsistent from one another, including J.N.'s initial denial that it ever happened that the conviction was only based on speculation and conjecture.

Likewise, the evidence was insufficient to convict on Counts I-IV.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids entering multiple convictions for the same offense. *State v. Freeman*, 153 Wn.2d 765, 770-71, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). Because this involves a question of law, whether an individual has been convicted twice for the same conduct in violation of the double jeopardy clause is reviewed de novo. 153 Wn.2d at 770. If there is any question that the two convictions arise from the same conduct, the rule of lenity

requires that the ambiguity be resolved against allowing a single incident to support multiple convictions. *State v. Tvedt*, 153 Wn.2d 705, 711, 107 P.3d 728 (2005). The Court of Appeals sustained the convictions by turning the review as an attack on credibility. It stated:

... Neighbarger's arguments are attacks on ZN's and JN's credibility, and the jury alone determines issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and persuasiveness of the evidence. *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 106. To the extent Neighbarger's sufficiency argument challenges the witnesses' credibility and the weight of conflicting evidence, his claim fails. *See Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 106.

Court's Opinion at 15.

However, the argument was not an attack on the credibility of the victims. It was based, as it was in *Hutton* and *Colquitt*, *supra*, that it could only be based on speculation and guesswork, thus making the convictions invalid. As such, the Court should accept review of this matter.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the arguments, records and files contained herein, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court accept review of this matter.

Respectfully submitted this 29 day of August, 2018.

HESTER LAW GROUP, INC., P.S.
Attorneys for Petitioner

By:


WAYNE C. FRICKE
WSB #16550

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Lee Ann Mathews, hereby certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington, that on the day set out below, I delivered true and correct copies of the petition for review to which this certificate is attached, by United States Mail or ABC-Legal Messengers, Inc., to the following:

Kathleen Proctor
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Richard G. Neighbarger
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Signed at Tacoma, Washington, this 29th day of August, 2018.


LEE ANN MATHEWS

July 31, 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,

v.

RICHARD GERALD NEIGHBARGER,
Appellant.

No. 50033-7-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

JOHANSON, J. — Richard Neighbarger appeals numerous convictions for first degree child rape, first degree child molestation, and first degree incest arising from sexual abuse of ZN¹ and JN. Neighbarger argues that (1) the trial court violated his right to present a defense, (2) the trial court erred under ER 404(b) when it admitted evidence of Neighbarger’s lustful disposition, (3) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend count XIII during trial, (4) insufficient evidence supports his convictions, (5) cumulative error denied his right to a fair trial, and (6) the trial court erred at sentencing. In addition, (7) Neighbarger’s statement of additional grounds (SAG) contains numerous arguments. Disagreeing with Neighbarger’s arguments, we affirm.

¹ We use the minor victims’ initials to protect their privacy. Gen. Order 2011-1 of Division II, *In re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Witnesses in Sex Crime Cases* (Wash. Ct. App.), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/.



FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

ZN and JN were Neighbarger and Sarah Neighbarger's children. Neighbarger was born in 1979. JN was born in 1996, and ZN was born in 2000. When JN was four or five years old and ZN was under a year old, the family lived with Neighbarger's mother for about a year, and when JN was six or seven years old, they lived in a rental home. When JN was seven or eight years old, the family moved into an apartment. In 2004, the family purchased and moved into a house in Puyallup.

In early September 2015, ZN disclosed that Neighbarger sexually abused him as a child. When law enforcement interviewed ZN, he discussed the child sexual abuse against himself and JN and disclosed that Neighbarger also attempted sexual contact with JN as an adult. After an investigation, law enforcement arrested Neighbarger. In September 2016, the State charged Neighbarger by amended information with eight counts of first degree child rape (counts I-IV, VI-VIII, XI), three counts of first degree child molestation (counts V, IX, X), and two counts of first degree incest (counts XII and XIII).

II. PRETRIAL

Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude evidence regarding the incident when Neighbarger attempted sexual contact with JN as an adult. The trial court admitted testimony about the event and the content of text messages.

III. STATE'S TESTIMONY

The State presented testimony from ZN and JN; ZN's high school teacher, Corey Evans; ZN's high school Assistant Principal Richard Lasso; numerous law enforcement officers involved

in the investigation after ZN's abuse disclosure; expert witness and forensic interviewer Keri Arnold; and Sarah.²

A. ZN'S TESTIMONY

ZN described four times when Neighbarger sexually abused ZN or JN. ZN described the first instance that he remembered Neighbarger sexually abusing him in the bedroom. While the sexual abuse occurred, Neighbarger watched child pornography on his computer. Second, ZN described sexual abuse by Neighbarger that occurred in the living room of his house when he was around 7 years old. Third, ZN described sexual abuse involving himself, JN, and Neighbarger in the living room when ZN was about 10 years old. Lastly, when ZN was approximately 12 years old, he walked into JN's bedroom and accidentally observed Neighbarger sexually abusing JN.

B. JN'S TESTIMONY

JN testified that Neighbarger sexually abused him numerous times. JN was 4 years old when Neighbarger first sexually abused JN at his grandmother's residence. When JN was 6 or 7 years old, Neighbarger sexually abused JN in the rec room of the rental home. JN described sexual abuse at the Puyallup home in the living room involving himself, ZN, and Neighbarger. JN also testified that Neighbarger sexually abused him as a child in JN's bedroom, Neighbarger's bedroom, the living room, the kitchen, and the front room. The sexual abuse ended when he was 14 or 15 years old.

Finally, in June 2015, when JN was 19 years old, he approached Neighbarger to get advice about a medical condition. Neighbarger attempted sexual contact with JN in the kitchen of the

² For clarity, Sarah Neighbarger will be referred to throughout by her first name.

Puyallup home. JN told him “no.” 6 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 395. JN sent a text message to ZN to let him know the details of what had happened. Defense counsel cross-examined JN regarding the timeline of sexual abuse and inconsistencies between what he told police in his initial interview and inconsistencies between JN’s and ZN’s testimony.

C. EXPERT TESTIMONY

Arnold, forensic interviewer for the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, testified about her professional experience interviewing children who have experienced trauma. She stated that children’s sense of time develops slowly, and they do not always precisely identify the time when a given sexual abuse incident occurred. And she discussed how traumatic experiences can result in generalized, routine descriptions about abusive events and a flat affect when discussing abuse.

D. SARAH NEIGHBARGER

After ZN’s disclosure, Sarah refused to provide consent to search ZN’s phone. Sarah denied that she told law enforcement that she and Neighbarger played pornography in the living room in the children’s presence. Sarah admitted that she told a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker that Neighbarger grabbed JN and ZN by the back of the neck to “hold them still,” but he never held the front of their necks or choked them. 4 VRP at 231.

E. LAW ENFORCEMENT TESTIMONY

Puyallup Police Department Detective Shelby Wilcox testified that Sarah had stated during the investigation that “it was commonplace for pornography to be running in the house.” 5 VRP at 285. Sarah also stated that she “knew that [ZN and JN] were hit with objects and choked.” 5

No. 50033-7-II

VRP at 287. Detective Wilcox said that Sarah “appeared to be kind of cold” to ZN after he disclosed the abuse. 5 VRP at 280.

Sergeant Tamera Pihl of the Puyallup Police Department testified about the investigation and said that Sarah refused to consent to a search because she did not want to “consent to something that may incriminate her husband.” 5 VRP at 344.

Jennifer Lopez-Silvers, CPS Investigator with the Children’s Administration, testified that when she spoke with Sarah, Sarah stated that she and Neighbarger frequently had pornographic pictures and videos showing in the living room, and they had stopped playing the videos two weeks before the interview because ZN did not like having them on. Lopez-Silvers said that Sarah disclosed that Neighbarger had “choked the kids” and held both children down by their necks. 5 VRP at 326.

IV. STATE’S MOTION

Before the State rested, it moved to amend the date for count XIII, which was based on the time when ZN walked in on Neighbarger sexually abusing JN in the bedroom. The State wanted to amend count XIII to encompass the expanded range of March 2010 to August 2013 because ZN’s testimony indicated that JN would have been 14 or 15 years old at the time and JN testified that the last time that Neighbarger sexually abused him as a minor occurred when he was 14 years old. This meant the abuse would have occurred in 2010, which was not reflected in the charging document. The trial court allowed the amendment to count XIII.

V. DEFENSE MOTION TO INTRODUCE REPUTATION EVIDENCE

Before calling its first witness Sarah, defense counsel moved for permission to ask Sarah about JN’s reputation for truthfulness. Defense counsel stated, “I want to ask her . . . about [JN’s]

reputation and truthfulness, because she has it in the negative.” 6 VRP at 514. The State objected, arguing in part that testimony regarding a witness’s reputation in a family community is not admissible under ER 608. The trial court ruled that defense counsel could inquire about JN’s reputation for truth and veracity, but such evidence needed to come from “a broader community” and not a family member. 6 VRP at 515.

VI. DEFENSE TESTIMONY

Neighbarger testified in relevant part that ZN and Neighbarger had planned a trip to Leavenworth together after he returned from a business trip, but they did not go on that trip because Neighbarger was arrested when he got off the plane.

VII. CLOSING ARGUMENTS

Defense counsel asserted that JN and ZN were not credible and made up the allegations as a way to get Neighbarger out of their house and out of their lives. Defense counsel discussed inconsistencies between JN’s and ZN’s testimony and JN’s prior statements to law enforcement.

In rebuttal, the State discussed ZN’s disclosure timing and said in relevant part, “What did we find out from the defendant’s testimony? What’s planned when he gets back? A boys’ getaway. Just him and [ZN] off to Leavenworth for the weekend.” 8 VRP at 722-23.

VIII. VERDICT AND SENTENCING

The jury returned guilty verdicts on all 13 counts and found aggravating factors on several.

Neighbarger stipulated to his offender score. The State recommended an exceptional sentence of 720 months to life in prison based on the 36-point offender score and the “abuse of trust” aggravators found by the jury. 9 VRP at 745. Defense counsel acknowledged that the jury found aggravating factors and the sentencing court had broad sentencing discretion to order above

the standard range. Defense counsel argued that the sentence would be indeterminate, so the judge should not impose an exceptional sentence. But defense counsel did not argue that the convictions should be treated as the same criminal conduct for the purpose of calculating his offender score and sentencing.

The sentencing court imposed an exceptional sentence upward of 480 months to life, based on an offender score of 36.

ANALYSIS

I. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE REGARDING VICTIM'S REPUTATION FOR DISHONESTY

Neighbarger argues that the trial court violated his right to present a defense when it excluded Sarah's proposed testimony regarding JN's reputation for dishonesty. We disagree.

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Criminal defendants have the right to present a defense. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST., art. I, § 22; *State v. Wittenbarger*, 124 Wn.2d 467, 474, 880 P.2d 517 (1994). But "the scope of that right does not extend to the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence." *State v. Aguirre*, 168 Wn.2d 350, 363, 229 P.3d 669 (2010). Accordingly, where evidence is inadmissible, excluding that evidence does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. *Aguirre*, 168 Wn.2d at 363.

We review for an abuse of discretion whether a party established the proper foundation to admit reputation testimony under ER 608. *State v. Gregory*, 158 Wn.2d 759, 804-05, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006), *overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr.*, 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner that is manifestly unreasonable

or based on untenable grounds or reasons. *State v. Land*, 121 Wn.2d 494, 500, 851 P.2d 678 (1993).

ER 608 provides that a party may attack or support a witness's credibility through evidence of the witness's reputation for untruthfulness in the community. "To establish a valid community, the party seeking to admit the reputation evidence must show that the community is both neutral and general." *Gregory*, 158 Wn.2d at 804 (quoting *Land*, 121 Wn.2d at 500). In determining whether the proffered "community is both neutral and general," the trial court considers factors such as "the frequency of contact between members of the community, the amount of time a person is known in the community, the role a person plays in the community, and the number of people in the community." *Land*, 121 Wn.2d at 500.

B. REPUTATION EVIDENCE PROPERLY EXCLUDED

Neighbarger attempts to frame his argument as a Sixth Amendment claim, saying that because Sarah's testimony regarding JN's reputation was excluded, he was denied his right to present a defense. But Neighbarger's right to present a defense was not violated if the evidence was properly excluded under ER 608. *Aguirre*, 168 Wn.2d at 363.

Neighbarger's proffered evidence was inadmissible because he failed to lay a proper foundation for reputation evidence under *Gregory*. In *Gregory*, our Supreme Court held that the victim's family was neither neutral nor sufficiently generalized to constitute a community under ER 608. 158 Wn.2d at 805. The court stated,

[T]he inherent nature of familial relationships often precludes family members from providing an unbiased and reliable evaluation of one another. In addition, the "community" with which Larson had discussed R.S.'s reputation included only two people, Larson and R.S.'s sister. Any community comprised of two individuals is too small to constitute a community for purposes of ER 608.

Gregory, 158 Wn.2d at 805 (citing *State v. Lord*, 117 Wn.2d 829, 874, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), *abrogated on other grounds by State v. Schierman*, ___ Wn.2d ___, 415 P.3d 106 (2018)).

Here, as in *Gregory*, Neighbarger’s proffered reputation testimony concerned only JN’s reputation with his mother, Sarah. 158 Wn.2d at 805. Defense counsel stated, “I want to ask her . . . about [JN’s] reputation and truthfulness, because she has it in the negative.” 6 VRP at 514. Sarah’s opinion of JN’s truthfulness, as testimony of a single family member, does not meet the general community nor the neutrality requirements to provide a foundation for ER 608 evidence. *See Gregory*, 158 Wn.2d at 805.

C. *CAYETANO-JAIMES*

Neighbarger relies on *State v. Cayetano-Jaimes*³ to support that the trial court erred by “excluding an entire class of testimony,” and thus denying his right to present a defense. Br. of Appellant at 10. In *Cayetano-Jaimes*, Division One of this court held that the defendant’s right to present a defense was violated when the trial court categorically excluded telephonic testimony. 190 Wn. App. at 291-92, 298-300.

But unlike the defendant in *Cayetano-Jaimes*, Neighbarger does not allege that he was prevented from presenting a witness’s entire testimony, nor that the court imposed a categorical bar on any mode of presenting evidence. Although Neighbarger is correct that *Cayetano-Jaimes* states that “per se rules excluding an entire class of testimony may violate a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense,” he has not explained how the trial court

³ 190 Wn. App. 286, 298, 359 P.3d 919 (2015).

imposed a “per se rule[] excluding an entire class of testimony” in this case. *Cayetano-Jaimes*, 190 Wn. App. at 298.

Here, the trial court specifically stated that proper reputation testimony would be admissible, but concluded that Neighbarger failed to lay a foundation for why Sarah’s testimony was proper under ER 608. Because Neighbarger failed to meet the foundation requirements under ER 608, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Sarah’s proposed testimony. *See Gregory*, 158 Wn.2d at 804; *Land*, 121 Wn.2d at 500.⁴

II. ER 404(b) EVIDENCE

The parties dispute whether the trial court erred when it admitted testimony that Neighbarger initiated sex with JN when JN was an adult to show lustful disposition toward JN. We agree with the State that the lustful disposition evidence was properly admitted under ER 404(b).

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW

We review the trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence of misconduct for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d 727, 745, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to abide by the rule’s requirements. *Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d at 745.

“Generally, evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct is inadmissible to demonstrate the accused person’s propensity to commit the crime charged.” *Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d at 744; ER 404(b).

⁴ In his reply brief, Neighbarger raises a new argument that the State “opened the door” to Sarah’s testimony. Reply Br. of Appellant at 1. Because he raises this issue for the first time in his reply, we do not consider it. *See State v. Chen*, 178 Wn.2d 350, 358 n.11, 309 P.3d 410 (2013) (citing *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992)). Moreover, Neighbarger’s argument relies on the assertion that JN testified that he was a “paragon of virtue,” and JN never testified to that. Reply Br. of Appellant at 2. As such, Neighbarger’s argument fails.

No. 50033-7-II

However, ER 404(b) allows the introduction of prior misconduct evidence to demonstrate the defendant's lustful disposition toward the victim. *State v. Camarillo*, 115 Wn.2d 60, 70, 794 P.2d 850 (1990); *State v. Ray*, 116 Wn.2d 531, 547, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991).

Lustful disposition evidence is admissible under ER 404(b) to show the lustful inclination of the defendant toward the victim, which makes it more probable that the defendant committed the offense charged. *Ray*, 116 Wn.2d at 547.

We read ER 404(b) in conjunction with ER 403. *Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d at 745. ER 403 requires the trial court to exercise its discretion in excluding relevant evidence that would be unfairly prejudicial. Before admitting misconduct evidence, the court must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct actually occurred, (2) identify the purpose of admitting the evidence, (3) determine the relevance of the evidence to prove an element of the crime, and (4) weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect of the evidence. *Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d at 745.

B. ADMISSION PROPER

Neighbarger argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Neighbarger's lustful disposition towards JN years after the last instance of abuse occurred because "'propensity'" evidence is "strictly prohibited." Br. of Appellant at 12. Neighbarger argues that "in a situation where the evidence is to show his disposition to commit child rape of the victim when the evidence is that the encounter involved consenting adults, the evidence is not relevant." Br. of Appellant at 13.

Contrary to Neighbarger's claims, properly admitted lustful disposition evidence is an exception to the general rule that evidence regarding a person's propensity to commit a crime is

No. 50033-7-II

inadmissible. *Fisher*, 165 Wn.2d at 744; *Ray*, 116 Wn.2d at 547. And as the State asserts, it is a long-standing principle that evidence of sexual acts between the defendant and victim that occurred before and after the charged acts are admissible to explain lustful disposition. *See, e.g., State v. Russell*, 171 Wn.2d 118, 121-24, 249 P.3d 604 (2011); *State v. Crowder*, 119 Wash. 450, 451-52, 205 P. 850 (1922) (cited by Br. of Resp't at 17-18). Here, the lustful disposition evidence is not simply evidence of lawful sexual advances by one adult against another—the evidence involves a sexual advance by a father towards his adult child. Even consensual sex between a father and an adult child is incest and a crime under RCW 9A.64.020. Thus, contrary to Neighbarger's assertions, the lustful disposition evidence does not use evidence of a legal sexual activity between two adults to prove lustful disposition toward the victim as a child. Here, the lustful disposition evidence instead involves evidence of an illegal incestuous act, which is highly probative of whether Neighbarger committed other, prior incestuous sexual acts against JN.

Furthermore, the State's reliance on *Russell* provides additional support that the lustful disposition evidence was admissible. In *Russell*, our Supreme Court concluded, in part, that the trial court did not err when it admitted evidence under ER 404(b) of sexual acts between the defendant and victim that occurred both before and after the charged crimes to prove Russell's lustful disposition toward his victim. 171 Wn.2d at 121-24. Here, like in *Russell*, the trial court properly admitted lustful disposition evidence of sexual acts between the defendant and victim that occurred after the last alleged sexual abuse.

C. BALANCING TEST

Neighbarger also asserts that reversal is required because the trial court erred when it did not perform the balancing test on the record. But any error is harmless.

A trial court's failure to conduct the balancing test on the record before admitting ER 404(b) evidence can still be harmless when the record is adequate for review. *State v. Jackson*, 102 Wn.2d 689, 694, 689 P.2d 76 (1984).

Here, the record is sufficient for us to determine that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. *See State v. Hepton*, 113 Wn. App. 673, 688, 54 P.3d 233 (2002). The trial court identified that the purpose of the evidence was to show "lustful disposition and the norm within the family that allegedly had been created." 1 VRP at 17. As the *Hepton* court held, on review we can weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect. 113 Wn. App. at 688. The lustful disposition evidence is probative of Neighbarger's lustful inclination toward JN, which makes it more probable that he committed the charged offenses, including incest. *See Ray*, 116 Wn.2d at 547. Although evidence that Neighbarger initiated sex with his adult child is prejudicial, it is not more prejudicial than probative in the context of Neighbarger's trial for numerous acts of rape, molestation, and incest. Because the lustful disposition evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, the trial court's failure to conduct the balancing test on the record is harmless, and the lustful disposition evidence was properly admitted under ER 404(b). *See Hepton*, 113 Wn. App. at 688; *Ray*, 116 Wn.2d at 547.

III. AMENDED CHARGES

Neighbarger argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State during trial to amend the time period covered by count XIII. We disagree.

We review a trial court's decision to amend charges for an abuse of discretion. *State v. Schaffer*, 120 Wn.2d 616, 621-22, 845 P.2d 281 (1993). The trial court may permit amendment

No. 50033-7-II

of an information “any time before verdict or finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” CrR 2.1(d).

Neighbarger asserts that the State’s amendment violated the holding in *State v. Pelkey*, 109 Wn.2d 484, 490-91, 745 P.2d 854 (1987). But Neighbarger’s reliance on *Pelkey* is misplaced. *Pelkey* holds that the State may not amend the information *after* it rests its case in chief unless it is to reduce the severity of the charges. 109 Wn.2d at 490-91. In Neighbarger’s case, the amendment occurred before the State rested its case. *Pelkey* fails to support that the amendment was improper. Neighbarger has thus failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to amend the time period covered by count XIII. *See* CrR 2.1(d); *Schaffer*, 120 Wn.2d at 621-22.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Neighbarger argues that sufficient evidence does not support his convictions because the convictions rely upon only “mere speculation.” Br. of Appellant at 14. But after a thorough review of the record, we disagree.

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW

We review sufficiency of the evidence *de novo*. *State v. Berg*, 181 Wn.2d 857, 867, 337 P.3d 310 (2014). When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Homan*, 181 Wn.2d 102, 105, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). We assume all of the State’s evidence and any reasonable inferences from it are true, and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in the State’s favor and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d

at 106. We defer to the jury to resolve issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and persuasiveness of the evidence. *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 106.

B. CREDIBILITY UNREVIEWABLE

Neighbarger argues that sufficient evidence does not support his convictions because JN's and ZN's testimony "differed in so many respects that any conviction could only be based on speculation." Br. of Appellant at 14. Neighbarger asserts that the dates provided by JN and ZN were not consistent, their descriptions of events were not consistent with each other, and JN was not reliable because his testimony differed from his police interview statements. But as the State asserts, Neighbarger's arguments are attacks on ZN's and JN's credibility, and the jury alone determines issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and persuasiveness of the evidence. *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 106. To the extent Neighbarger's sufficiency argument challenges the witnesses' credibility and the weight of conflicting evidence, his claim fails. *See Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 106.

C. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS EACH CONVICTION

Although Neighbarger's sufficiency arguments relate to only credibility issues, he argues in a heading that there was "insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Neighbarger of the charges," and one of his assignments of error states that sufficient evidence did not support counts I-IV and counts XI-XIII. Br. of Appellant at 14 (capitalization omitted). But after a review of the record we conclude that sufficient evidence supports his convictions.⁵

⁵ We hold that any additional argument that Neighbarger makes only in a heading is insufficient for us to address. *See State v. Thomas*, 150 Wn.2d 821, 868-69, 83 P.3d 970 (2004); RAP 10.3(a)(6).

1. FIRST DEGREE CHILD RAPE

Neighbarger appears to argue that sufficient evidence does not support his convictions for first degree child rape (counts I-IV, VI-VIII, XI).

To prove first degree child rape under RCW 9A.44.073(1), the State must establish that the perpetrator had “sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least twenty-four months older than the victim.” *State v. Bobenhouse*, 166 Wn.2d 881, 888, 214 P.3d 907 (2009) (quoting RCW 9A.44.073(1)). A person may be liable for the acts of another if he or she is an accomplice to the act. RCW 9A.08.020(1), (2)(c); *State v. Farnsworth*, 185 Wn.2d 768, 780, 374 P.3d 1152 (2016). One is an “accomplice” of another if the person aids or agrees to aid the other in planning or committing the crime, with the knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of such crime. RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii); *Farnsworth*, 185 Wn.2d at 780.

The only element that Neighbarger appears to challenge is the “sexual intercourse with another who is less than twelve years old” element for each rape charge. RCW 9A.44.073(1).

However, JN’s testimony supports counts I-IV. JN’s testimony was sufficient to support the sexual intercourse element for first degree rape.⁶ ZN’s testimony supports counts VI-VIII. This testimony is sufficient to support the sexual intercourse element for counts VI-VIII. JN’s and ZN’s testimony supports count XI. By directing JN’s and ZN’s acts, Neighbarger promoted and facilitated sexual intercourse with a person under age 12 and became an accomplice to the crime.

⁶ The jury was instructed that it “must unanimously agree as to which act has been proved.” Clerk’s Papers at 226.

No. 50033-7-II

RCW 9A.44.073(1); RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii); *Farnsworth*, 185 Wn.2d at 780. As such, JN's and ZN's testimony supports count XI.

2. FIRST DEGREE CHILD MOLESTATION

Neighbarger appears to argue that sufficient evidence does not support his convictions for first degree child molestation (counts V, IX, X).

To prove first degree child molestation, the State must prove the offender had "sexual contact with another who is less than twelve years old and not married to the perpetrator and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim." RCW 9A.44.083(1). The only disputed element is that Neighbarger had "sexual contact with another who is less than twelve years old." RCW 9A.44.083(1).

A review of the record shows that ZN's testimony supports count V. In addition, ZN's testimony supports counts IX-X.

3. FIRST DEGREE INCEST

Finally, Neighbarger appears to argue that sufficient evidence does not support his convictions for first degree incest (counts XII and XIII).

To prove first degree incest, the State must establish that the person "engage[d] in sexual intercourse with a person whom he or she knows to be related to him or her, either legitimately or illegitimately, as an ancestor, descendant, brother, or sister of either the whole or the half blood." RCW 9A.64.020(1)(a).

A review of the record shows that ZN's testimony supports count XII and count XIII. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved each of the charged crimes' elements beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Sweany*,

No. 50033-7-II

174 Wn.2d 909, 914, 281 P.3d 305 (2012); *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 105-06. As such, sufficient evidence supports Neighbarger's convictions. *Homan*, 181 Wn.2d at 106.

V. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Neighbarger argues that cumulative error denied him a fair trial. We reject Neighbarger's cumulative error argument.

We review cumulative error claims de novo. *State v. Clark*, 187 Wn.2d 641, 649, 389 P.3d 462 (2017). “[A] defendant may be entitled to a new trial when cumulative errors produce a trial that is fundamentally unfair.” *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 766, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). Neighbarger must show that “while multiple trial errors, ‘standing alone, might not be of sufficient gravity to constitute grounds for a new trial, the combined effect of the accumulation of errors most certainly requires a new trial.’” *Clark*, 187 Wn.2d at 649 (quoting *State v. Coe*, 101 Wn.2d 772, 789, 684 P.2d 668 (1984)).

A cumulative error claim that relies on a single, nonprejudicial error fails. *See, e.g., Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 766; *State v. Yarbrough*, 151 Wn. App. 66, 97-98, 210 P.3d 1029 (2009).

The only error Neighbarger has properly identified is the trial court's failure under ER 404(b) to conduct a balancing test before admitting evidence of Neighbarger's lustful disposition towards JN. But the error under ER 404(b) was harmless error. Because Neighbarger established only a single, nonprejudicial error, his cumulative error claim fails. *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 766; *Yarbrough*, 151 Wn. App. at 97-98.

VI. SAME CRIMINAL CONDUCT

Neighbarger argues that the trial court erred when it failed to consider certain convictions as the same criminal conduct for the purpose of calculating his offender score, and his offender score was actually 14 or 16. Neighbarger waived his same criminal conduct argument.

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW

A defendant waives a challenge to a miscalculated offender score when the alleged error involves an agreement to facts, later disputed, or when the alleged error involves a matter of trial court discretion. *In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin*, 146 Wn.2d 861, 874, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). A defendant's offender score challenge involves an agreement to facts and a matter of trial court discretion, and is thus subject to waiver, when a defendant stipulates to his offender score and then, for the first time on appeal, argues that the convictions constitute the same criminal conduct. *Goodwin*, 146 Wn.2d at 875 (citing *State v. Nitsch*, 100 Wn. App. 512, 523, 997 P.2d 1000 (2000)).

B. WAIVER

In *Nitsch*, the defendant agreed in a presentence report that his offender score was properly calculated. 100 Wn. App. at 517, 521-22. On appeal, he argued for the first time that two of his convictions were the same criminal conduct such that they could not each be counted in the other's offender score. *Nitsch*, 100 Wn. App. at 518. Division One of this court held that the defendant had waived the offender score challenge that was based on the unpreserved same criminal conduct argument. *Nitsch*, 100 Wn. App. at 519, 522-23. The court held that a determination of whether crimes are the same criminal conduct involves both factual determinations and exercise of discretion, and thus failure to raise the matter at sentencing results in waiver. *Nitsch*, 100 Wn. App. at 522-23. The court emphasized the negative consequences that would result from

No. 50033-7-II

reviewing the matter without a sufficient record to evaluate the trial court's exercise of discretion. *Nitsch*, 100 Wn. App. at 524-25.

Like the defendant in *Nitsch*, Neighbarger stipulated to his offender score and at sentencing did not challenge the offender score or argue that any of his convictions are the same criminal conduct. *Nitsch*, 100 Wn. App. at 517, 522-23. As such, like the defendant's arguments in *Nitsch*, Neighbarger's arguments challenging his offender score are waived. 100 Wn. App. at 519, 522-23.

Even if we were to reach this argument, it still fails on the merits. Neighbarger concedes that his offender score would still be over nine points if the sentencing court accepts his same criminal conduct arguments. As such, his standard sentencing range would not change, even if his arguments were accepted. *See State v. Argo*, 81 Wn. App. 552, 569, 915 P.2d 1103 (1996); *State v. Kilgore*, 141 Wn. App. 817, 825, 172 P.3d 373 (2007), *aff'd*, 167 Wn.2d 28, 216 P.3d 393 (2009). Neighbarger has not established that reversal of his sentences would be appropriate under these circumstances.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

I. MATTERS OUTSIDE THE RECORD

Neighbarger argues that (1) the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury when it "ignored" jurors' statements that "it would be a hardship to be on jury duty during the holidays" (SAG at 2); (2) investigators engaged in unlawful destruction of evidence when they allegedly returned Neighbarger's work laptop to his workplace; (3) the trial court erred when it excluded Neighbarger's lie detector test results; and (4) the "trial court erred when it refused Mr. Neighbarger's attorney the right to interview the accusers." SAG at 1.

On direct appeal, the reviewing court will not consider matters outside the trial record. *State v. McFarland*, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

Here, the record does not contain voir dire transcripts documenting the exercise of for cause challenges for jurors with hardships, so there is no record of whether the trial court “ignored” jurors’ hardship claims. In addition, the record does not contain information regarding investigators’ handling of defendant’s work laptop, transcripts from any pretrial hearing at which the court excluded the polygraph results, nor any indication that the trial court denied defense counsel the opportunity to interview JN and ZN. Because Neighbarger’s arguments rely on matters outside the record, the arguments fail.

II. DEFINITION OF PORNOGRAPHY

Neighbarger argues that the trial court erred when it failed to define “pornography,” such that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and First Amendment speech rights. Specifically, he argues that because the prosecution presented evidence that Neighbarger watched pornography, but the court never defined pornography for the jury, this led “the jury to use their own definition of pornography and allowed them to believe that it was illegal causing obvious prejudicial errors.” SAG at 1.

Neighbarger’s argument rests on a false assumption. Contrary to Neighbarger’s argument, the jury did not apply a definition of pornography nor evaluate the legality of Neighbarger’s pornography viewing. The jury was not asked to make any findings that required a definition of “pornography,” and no charges required the jury to determine whether Neighbarger viewed or possessed pornography. The jury instructions did not use the term pornography, so defining the term would not have helped the jury. Moreover, Neighbarger’s attorney did not request an

instruction to define pornography. Neighbarger has failed to show that the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to provide a definition of pornography.

III. HEARSAY

Neighbarger argues that the trial court erred when it allowed hearsay evidence regarding Sarah's statements to Detective Wilcox, Sergeant Pihl, and CPS worker Lopez-Silvers. We reject Neighbarger's argument.

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW

"We review the admission of hearsay for an abuse of discretion." *State v. Mason*, 160 Wn.2d 910, 922, 162 P.3d 396 (2007). A party must raise a hearsay objection to preserve the issue for appellate review. *State v. Smith*, 155 Wn.2d 496, 501, 120 P.3d 559 (2005).

"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." ER 801(c). A statement that falls within this definition is inadmissible, subject to various exemptions and exceptions. ER 802; see ER 801(d) (exemptions); ER 803-04 (exceptions). "[T]o the extent that a witness' own prior inconsistent statement is offered to cast doubt on his or her credibility, it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is nonhearsay, and it may be admissible 'to impeach.'" *State v. Williams*, 79 Wn. App. 21, 26, 902 P.2d 1258 (1995) (emphasis omitted).

B. NO ERROR

Neighbarger challenges three different statements as hearsay. Specifically, Neighbarger argues that the trial court erred when it admitted (1) Lopez-Silvers's testimony that Sarah told her that Neighbarger "'had choked the kids'" and engaged in other physical abuse, (2) Wilcox's opinion testimony that Sarah was cold towards ZN after he made the disclosure, and (3) Sergeant

Pihl's statement that Sarah refused to consent to a search of Neighbarger's phone. SAG at 4. Neighbarger fails to establish a hearsay violation regarding any of these statements.

First, Lopez-Silvers's testimony regarding Sarah's prior statements to law enforcement was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach Sarah's testimony that Neighbarger never choked the children or physically abused them. Because the statements were admitted for impeachment purposes, the statements were not hearsay and the trial court did not err in admitting them. *Williams*, 79 Wn. App. at 26.

Second, Wilcox's opinion that Sarah acted coldly towards ZN was not hearsay because it did not involve an out-of-court statement by Sarah that was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. *See* ER 801(c). Wilcox's personal observations of Sarah's demeanor did not involve testimony about statements that Sarah made. As such, the testimony was not hearsay. ER 801(c).

Third, defense counsel did not raise at trial a hearsay objection to Sergeant Pihl's statement that Sarah declined consent to search because she didn't want to do something that would incriminate her husband. Because defense counsel did not assert a hearsay objection below, it is waived on appeal. *Smith*, 155 Wn.2d at 501.

Neighbarger's hearsay arguments fail because he challenges testimony that was not hearsay or for which he has waived a hearsay objection. ER 801(c); *Williams*, 79 Wn. App. at 26; *Smith*, 155 Wn.2d at 501. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the challenged statements.

IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Neighbarger argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by lying during closing argument. We reject this argument.

A. PRINCIPLES OF LAW

“Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” *State v. Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d 423, 430, 326 P.3d 125 (2014) (quoting *State v. Brett*, 126 Wn.2d 136, 174-75, 892 P.2d 29 (1995)). “The defendant bears the burden of showing that the comments were improper and prejudicial.” *Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d at 430. If the defendant fails to object to the State’s conduct or fails to request a curative instruction at trial, the issue of misconduct is waived unless it was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice. *Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d at 430.

We review a prosecutor’s comments during closing argument in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the jury instructions. *State v. Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d 559, 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003). A prosecutor has wide latitude in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and to express such inferences to the jury. *Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d at 577. However, a prosecutor may not make statements that are unsupported by the evidence and prejudice the defendant. *Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d at 577.

B. NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Neighbarger challenges the following statement from closing argument:

What did we find out from the defendant’s testimony? What’s planned when he gets back? A boys’ getaway. Just him and [ZN] off to Leavenworth for the weekend. It made every sense in the world to come forward when he did.

9 VRP at 722-23.

Neighbarger argues that the State lied because he never testified it would be just the two of them going to Leavenworth, and actually other individuals were planning to go on the trip as well.


Contrary to Neighbarger's assertion, the prosecutor's challenged statement was proper argument based on the evidence. *See Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d at 577. Neighbarger testified that "[ZN and I] were supposed to go on a run in Leavenworth when I got back from Texas." 7 VRP at 589. The State drew a reasonable inference from this testimony and asserted an argument based on the evidence when it asserted that ZN disclosed when he did, in part, to avoid traveling with Neighbarger. *Dhaliwal*, 150 Wn.2d at 577. Neighbarger has failed to establish that the State's argument, to which he did not object at trial, was improper, nor has he shown that the statement was "so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice." *Lindsay*, 180 Wn.2d at 430. As such, his prosecutorial misconduct claim fails.

CONCLUSION


We reject Neighbor's arguments and accordingly we affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.


We concur:



MAXA, C.J.



SUTTON, J.



JOHANSON, J.

HESTER LAW GROUP, INC., P.S.

August 29, 2018 - 3:51 PM

Filing Petition for Review

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Appellate Court Case Number: Case Initiation
Appellate Court Case Title: State of Washington, Respondent v. Richard G. Neighbarger, Appellant (500337)

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